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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

the negligence standard applies in all other flooding circumstances
unrelated to changes in a river's carrying capacity.
Jensen next argued the trial court erred by admitting statistical
evidence of historical River runoff levels. Jensen contended the trial
court should have excluded the evidence, under Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, because its prejudicial effect outweighed its
probative value. The court held the probative value of the statement
"that flooding of the 1983's and 1984's magnitude would occur only
once every 200 to 30,000 years" was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. The court supported this holding with the fact that
Jensen had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and establish
the 200 to 30,000 year flood occurred in two consecutive years.
Jensen also argued the trial court should have excluded a
videotape depicting a dam downstream of the Reservoir collapsing as a
result of the 1983 flooding. Jensen claimed the video was irrelevant
because it depicted a flooding area far downstream from Jensen's land.
The court found that IPA introduced the video to support its position
that system wide flooding necessitated considerations of conditions
downstream in the management of the Reservoir. Therefore, the
court upheld the admission of the video as relevant in IPA's defense of
negligence.
Finally, Jensen appealed ajury instruction relating to the authority
of the River Commissioner. The instruction in dispute instructed the
jury to find for the plaintiff if they found IPA had the right or ability to
control the discharge of water from the Reservoir, and the River
Commissioner was IPA's agent. Jensen argued this instruction ignored
the fact that IPA negligence may result even if the commissioner did
not act as IPA's agent. The court held that if the jury instructions,
taken as a whole, instruct jury on the applicable law, then reversible
error does not occur because one instruction, standing alone, is
inaccurate. The jury instructions here considered as a whole, allowed
the jury to find IPA negligent even if the River Commissioner did not
act as IPA's agent. Therefore, the court held the trial court did not err
in instructing the jury on the applicable law.
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Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc., 976 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1999)
(holding a property owners association can levy assessments on a
property owner in accordance with the associations governing
documents even when the expenditure does not benefit the owner's
property).
H. Ross Workman ("Workman") filed suit to prevent Brighton
Properties, Inc. ("Brighton") from levying an assessment for the
development of a water system in Silver Lake Estates Subdivision No. 1
that did not benefit Workman's property in Silver Lake Estates
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Subdivision No. 2.
Silver Lake Estates consisted of two subdivisions, No. 1 and No. 2,
located approximately one mile apart in Big Cottonwood Canyon.
Brighton, a non-profit organization, provided services to lot owners in
Subdivisions No. I and No. 2. The lot owners in Silver Lake Estates
each owned one share of Brighton stock. The same articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and restrictive covenants governed both
subdivisions.
In 1986, Workman and his wife entered into an agreement to
purchase lot three in subdivision No. 2. The warranty deed conveying
the property to Workman subjected the property to covenants,
conditions, rights of way, easements, and reservations of record
enforceable in law or equity. In 1996, Brighton notified Silver Lake
Estates property owners of a $300 assessment to fund a study of
Brighton's water source and distribution system. The sole issue before
the Utah Supreme Court was whether the trial court correctly held
Brighton could levy the $300 assessment against Workman.
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis with the relevant
documents.
It found that Brighton's articles of incorporation
intended the corporation to own water rights and engage in water
development for the benefit of the two subdivisions. In addition, the
bylaws empowered the Board of Trustees to assess each shareholder
necessary amounts to carry out the purposes of the corporation. The
court recognized that Workman's warranty deed subjected his lot to
restrictive covenants, and found the covenants addressed the
relationship between water development and assessments levied on the
two subdivisions in great detail.
The court held the bylaws of a corporation, the articles of
incorporation, the statute under which the corporation was
incorporated, and the members' application constituted a contract
between the member and the corporation. Furthermore, the court
held that recorded restrictive covenants were enforceable against
property owners who purchased property subject to those covenants.
Workman did not dispute his contractual obligations to Brighton,
however, he argued Brighton could only levy an assessment against
him if his lot benefited from the expenditure. The court found that
the aforementioned documents clearly contemplated improvements to
both subdivisions, however, not necessarily at one time. Relying on
precedent, the court held that although a landowner may not benefit
from an assessment, the terms of the governing documents still
required him to pay the full assessment. The court noted that
Workman did not receive an overriding inequity because he had
notice of his obligation to pay assessments, and there was no evidence
the assessment was used to disproportionately benefit one group of lot
owners. Therefore, the court upheld the trial court decision.
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